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INTRODUCTION
Thank you for the invitation to deliver this keynote and for the
opportunity to talk about our book, The Positive Second
Amendment: Rights, Regulation and the Future of Heller.1 This
book builds upon the hard work that many people in this room
* Lanty L. Smith '67 Professor of Law & Melvin G. Shimm Professor of Law,
Duke Law School. We are grateful to Orion Ray and the editors of the Charleston
Law Review for their superb work in pulling together this symposium, and to the
Riley Institute at Furman University for its support. Many thanks to Jake
Charles for feedback on these remarks.
1. JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND
AMENDMENT: RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER (2018).
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have performed over the past few decades.2 One result of that work
was to transform the Second Amendment from a powerful political
movement into an enforceable personal right, from a right focused
on militia purposes to one concerned with personal purposes, from
a moral argument into a legal one.
Ten years after the Supreme Court's decision in Heller, we all
are part of an exciting and challenging moment in which judges,
scholars and citizens are faced with the task of shaping what is
essentially a new constitutional right. We are thrilled to be
engaged in that project along with you.
It is fitting that we should have this discussion here, not far
from where some of the most significant shots in United States
history were fired. Of course, you all know the history of Fort
Sumter well enough. But we would like to begin our remarks by
speaking not of Major Anderson or General Beauregard, but of
Daniel Sickles, the Union general who could later become Military
Governor of the State of South Carolina.
To say that Sickles had a complicated relationship with
firearms would be an understatement. In 1858, then-
Representative Sickles, a sitting United States congressman, shot
dead, in broad daylight, the United States Attorney for the District
of Columbia, Philip Barton Key (son of "Star Spangled Banner"
author Francis Scott Key). Key had been conducting a very public
affair with Sickles's wife (whom Sickles himself had been cheating
on). But, this being the nineteenth century, and honor among
adulterers being what it was, Sickles ambushed the unarmed Key
as he waited outside Sickles's home. Sickles claimed that Key's
affair with his wife had driven him temporarily mad, and-in one
of the first successful uses of the temporary insanity defense in
U.S. history-the jury acquitted him.3
2. Dictionaries, treatises, books, collections, law review articles, online
articles, and newspaper articles account for 100 of the 175 sources cited by the
majority in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). The remainder
includes all federal and state cases, all state and federal statutes, state
constitutions, and legislative history. Those 100 sources make up over half of the
citations in the opinion. We are grateful to Alyssa Rutsch, Duke Law Class of
2015, for reviewing the citations.
3. WILLIAM BARCLAY NAPTON, THE UNION ON TRIAL: THE POLITICAL
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But it is not Sickles's checkered background or personal use of
firearms that makes him famous among Second Amendment
scholars. Instead, it is his instruction issued in January 1866,
while overseeing the military reconstruction of South Carolina
after the civil war, General Order Number 1. That order read in
part: "The constitutional rights of all loyal and well-disposed
inhabitants to bear arms will not be infringed."4
This order has been celebrated by many gun-rights supporters
for its clear statement in support of a personal right to keep and
bear arms. And yet the order is often truncated. Just after the
semicolon, it states: "nevertheless this [order] shall not be
construed to sanction the unlawful practice of carrying concealed
weapons; nor to authorize any person to enter with arms on the
premises of another against his consent. . . . And no disorderly
person, vagrant, or disturber of the peace shall be allowed to bear
arms."s
Later that same year, General Sickles further qualified his
famous Order Number 1, stating in General Order Number 7 that
"[o]rganizations of white or colored persons bearing arms, or
intended to be armed" were prohibited, as were any attempt of
such groups to "assemble, parade, patrol, drill, make arrests or
exercise any authority."6
We have begun our remarks with Daniel Sickles because he is
compelling, because of his connection to South Carolina, and
because he and his orders capture, in microcosm, the conflicting
impulses and beliefs Americans have with respect to firearms -
conflicts that often find their way into constitutional law. By the
time Heller was decided, a strong majority of Americans believed
that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms extends
beyond the organized militia. But an equally large majority favors
what it sees as reasonable gun regulation. Collectively, we think
JOURNALS OF JUDGE WILLIAM BARCLAY NAPTON, 1829-1883 at 501 n.117
(Christopher Phillips & Jason L. Pendleton eds., 2005).
4. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 908 (1866) (Rep. William Lawrence)
(quoting Sickles's order).
5. Id. at 908-909.
6. 1 WALTER L. FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 211
(1906) (reprinting sections I and III of General Order No. 7).
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of guns as valuable tools, as devices for sport and entertainment,
as emblems of freedom and citizenship. But we also recognize that
they are instruments of violence, responsible for more than a
hundred thousand injuries and deaths in the United States every
year, 7 including the murders just a few blocks from here at Mother
Emanuel Church. To put it in perspective, more Americans die
annually from gunshots (roughly 30,000)8 than the total number
of South Carolina troops who died during the four years of the Civil
War (no more than 22,000 by most estimates).9
Given this stark reality, and the complicated relationship our
nation has, and has had, with firearms, one may legitimately ask:
what is so positive about the Second Amendment? In the short 45
minutes we have, we will try to provide a justification for the title
of our book and the theme of this address.
WHAT WE MEAN BY "POSITIVE"
By "positive," we primarily mean three things.
First, we mean positive in the sense of healthy and
constructive. The political conversation about guns is - to put it
mildly-broken. There's lots of epithets but not a lot of
understanding. There's lots of shouting, but not a lot of listening.
One's views of guns are all too frequently used as a shibboleth, as
a way of choosing sides, of separating "us" from "them."
The notion of a "positive" Second Amendment expresses our
hope that an understanding of the law of the Second Amendment
can help generate a more productive conversation about guns and
gun policy, and that the law can be used to facilitate a discussion,
rather than to shut one down.
Our optimism is partly due the fact that constitutional law
consistently represents the position that most Americans hold:
7. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTON, WEB-BASED INJURY
STATISTICS QUERY AND REPORTING SYSTEM, Retrieved
https://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/index.html (last visited May 3,
2018)[https://perma.cc/3EFN-SC4G].
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Cameron McWhirter, The Numbers War Between the States,
WALL ST. J., March 26, 2011 (no more than 22,000); American Battlefield Trust,
Civil War Casualties, https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/civil-war-
casualties (less than 20,000).
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support for a fundamental, individual right to keep and bear arms,
and also for reasonable gun regulations. Partisans and interest
groups often try to force a choice between those two: You are either
for rights or you are for regulation.
But the Second Amendment, both before and after Heller,
makes it clear that that's a false choice. We can have both, just as
we always have. Call it the "constitutional alternative" to the
partisan shouting. The constitutional alternative will not satisfy
the small, vocal minorities who want to see all guns abolished or
who oppose all gun regulations. But the Constitution is not with
them; it is with the solid majority of Americans who believe that
rights and regulation can and should co-exist.
Second, we mean positive in the sense that the Second
Amendment is the law of the land after Heller. In his Heller
opinion, Justice Scalia suggested that the Court simply confirmed
a status quo: a pre-existing right that the Court was finally willing
to recognize..10 But as a matter of doctrinal description, that is an
extremely hard position to defend. Whatever one thinks about the
correctness of Heller, it certainly represented a sea change in the
law-otherwise we would not be talking about it here today. Prior
to 2008, persons claiming a federal constitutional right to have a
firearm for private purposes could not survive a motion to
dismiss;llafter 2008 (with some exceptions), they could.
In the ten years since Heller, lower courts have resolved more
than 1,000 Second Amendment challenges. Even with minimal
guidance from the Supreme Court, the law governing the right to
keep and bear arms is taking shape. Professor Blocher, working
with co-author Professor Eric Ruben, recently coded every
available Second Amendment decision (state and federal, trial and
appellate) from Heller through February 1, 2016.12 For each
individual Second Amendment challenge, they asked roughly 100
10. Heller, 554 U.S. at 593.
11. Clark Neily, Revisiting the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments:
District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second Amendment Is Back, Baby, 2007-2008
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 127, 140 (noting that not a single federal case struck down a
gun law on Second Amendment grounds prior to Heller).
12. Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical
Analysis of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433
(2018).
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questions about the content of the challenge, the result, and the
court's methodology. They assembled more than 100,000 data
points, painting a picture of where Second Amendment law stands
today.
The image that results is one where, by and large, courts are
treating the post-Heller Second Amendment like a "normal" part
of constitutional law. As Justice Scalia observed in Heller, the
right to keep and bear arms, just like any other right, is not
absolute. It has exceptions, some of them derived from history.13 It
is subject to regulation, which must typically conform to some
sliding-scale examination of constitutionality, in which burdens on
the "core" of the right are subject to strict scrutiny, and lesser
burdens are subject to something less stringent.14 The failure rate
for Second Amendment claims remains very high-more than
90%-but many of the challenges were weak to begin with.
Hundreds were brought by felons, for example, who Heller
recognize as being largely carved out from the Second
Amendment's coverage. 15
In short, in more than 1,000 cases since Heller, courts are
using the basic tools of analysis familiar to constitutional lawyers.
The right is "positive" in the sense of being a real legal entitlement,
subject to standard legal analysis.
Third and finally, we mean positive in the technical,
jurisprudential sense that the Second Amendment is not natural
or God-given, it is not discovered or revealed, it is "posited"-it is
law. And there are rules by which American society identifies
when something is law and when it is not.
This notion of "positive" law is familiar to scholars of legal
theory and jurisprudence. It is, ultimately, the set of questions
that has motivated thinkers like Thomas Hobbes, John Austin,
H.L.A. Hart, Joseph Raz, and Ronald Dworkin. But one does not
have to be a philosopher to recognize that the Star Spangled
13. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
14. Nelson Lund, Promise and Perils in the Nascent Jurisprudence of the
Second Amendment, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 207, 216 (2016) (noting that courts
tend to use intermediate scrutiny for Second Amendment cases dealing with
regulations that do not affect core rights).
15. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
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Banner is not law, the Constitution is, and we know one from the
other by the rules that define law from other sources of authority.
Legal philosophers have devoted a great deal of time describing
and justifying this "rule of recognition,"16 but one does not need a
J.D. or Ph.D. to intuit that there is a line between legal and non-
legal claims.
In the wake of Heller, we think it is crucial to recognize the
existence of that line, even if we might disagree about its precise
location. The gun rights advocates who prevailed in Heller did so
because they thought that their view of the Second Amendment,
one shared by the majority of Americans,17 should be protected by
courts as well. Their victory means something. As we have already
noted, it has been the center of more than 1,000 court challenges
in the past ten years.
But that victory also carries with it a change. Heller is a
constitutional decision of the Supreme Court, an act of law
making. It is not-by its own account-an imposition of political
philosophy by five of nine justices. And constitutional law
demands and responds to different kinds of arguments than one
might employ at a political rally or, for that matter, in a faculty
lounge.
Our point is not that the line is obvious. We do not need to tell
a room full of lawyers, let alone law and society scholars, that the
distinction between law and other social practices can be hard to
identify. In constitutional law in particular, there are very hard
questions about how doctrine does or should account for or
incorporate other sources of authority. Our goal is not to downplay
the difficulty of the task, but to emphasize its importance.
Nor do we think that there is no interplay between "positive"
law and other notions of "higher law," basic rights, or morality.
The right to keep and bear arms, like that to free speech or equal
protection, can have a moral dimension to it. One might argue that
self-defense is a basic "human right" that does not depend on the
16. See generally THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
(Matthew Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma, eds. 2009)
17. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans in Agreement with Supreme Court on Gun
Rights, Gallup (June 26, 2008), http://news.gallup.com/poll/108394/americans-
agreement-supreme-court-gun-rights.aspx.
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Constitution for legitimacy. One often hears that point made as a
matter of rhetoric. One reading of Heller's remark about the right
"pre-existing" could suggest as much.
But in a very real sense, Justice Scalia could not have meant
that. The late Justice spent much of his career criticizing his
colleagues for allegedly writing their preferred moral views into
constitutional doctrine.18 Can it really be that, in his most
significant majority opinion, his magnum opus, he did the same?
And if the right of self-preservation is a natural right that pre-
exists, indeed transcends the Constitution, why fuss over the text,
history, and precedent of the Second Amendment? Why treat it as
law at all?
We do not need to speculate about Justice Scalia's mindset,
though-we need only look at what we wrote, and what courts
have done, with Second Amendment claims. And what we see is
an application of legal reason, not an appeal to transcendent
principles or natural law.
We are all here for this conversation today because the Second
Amendment has entered a new era. If it is to be treated as
"normal" constitutional law, then it must also be subject to the
tools of "normal" constitutional argument. And legal arguments
have a different grammar, and a different truth value, than those
derived from politics or morality alone. A moral claim like
"undocumented immigrants have natural rights to keep and bear
arms" cannot be proven true or false in the same way, using the
same forms of argument as a legal claim that "undocumented
immigrants have a right to keep and bear arms under the Second
Amendment."
To say that a right to keep and bear arms derives from positive
law rather than natural law is not necessarily to limit it. Consider
moral rights to self-defense - the "central component" of the
Second Amendment according to Heller.19 Most moral
18. Sam Baker, "Not My Job" to be "Moral Philosopher", THEHILL.COM, (Oct.
1, 2013, 1:01 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/325677-
justice-scalia-not-my-job-to-act-as-moral-philosopher ("Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia on Monday criticized judges for acting as 'moral philosophers' in
decisions on abortion and gay rights.").
19. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
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philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition have specified that
self-defense is justified, but only according to some limited
circumstances: the force must be necessary to protect the person
from an imminent harm and be proportional to the threat. Indeed,
this is the common law baseline of self-defense in the American
legal tradition.20 But some states have expanded these bounds,
permitting self-defense when not otherwise necessary or
proportional as traditionally understood, for example through the
adoption of stand your ground laws.21 And, more pointedly, the
Second Amendment permits gun ownership even in circumstances
where there is no necessity and where the force used could in fact
be disproportionate.22
In any event, our purpose in these remarks is not to advocate
the appropriate balance or to argue for a broader or narrower
understanding of gun rights. Our point is that to recognize gun
rights as creatures of positive law, in the technical sense, demands
an understanding of the rules of legal argument, which differ in
important respects from the kinds of rhetoric that one often hears
in the gun debate. Constitutional law has a grammar; a set of rules
about how arguments are constructed.
We are hardly the first scholars to recognize this, of course.
Thirty years ago, Philip Bobbitt identified what he called the
"modalities" of constitutional argument-the legitimate methods
of constitutional reasoning.23 With some tweaks in emphasis,
those same modalities can point the way to a more productive
discussion of the Second Amendment, one that everyone can
participate in.
20. Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward A Normative
Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 377 (1996) (outlining
elements of self-defense).
21. Elizabeth Elkin & Dakin Andone, What You Need to Know about "Stand
Your Ground" Laws, CNN.com, July 29, 2018,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/29/us/stand-your-ground-law-explainer-
trndlindex.html.
22. Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second Amendment,
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
23. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991);
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982).
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THE MODALITIES OF SECOND AMENDMENT ARGUMENT
To be clear, our goal today is not to evaluate the
constitutionality of any particular gun regulation. Nor is it to offer
some single methodological approach to these questions - whether
labeled "living constitutionalism" or "originalism," intermediate
scrutiny or "text, history, and tradition." No other constitutional
right is subject to such a one-size-fits-all approach, and it would be
surprising if the Second Amendment were. Instead, we wish to
show how Second Amendment questions are, and should be,
analyzed-the kinds of tools that a judge, lawyer, scholar, or
anyone else interested in constitutional law should employ when
asked whether a gun regulation is consistent with the
Constitution. In doing so - again inspired by Bobbitt - we want to
describe seven modalities by which Second Amendment doctrine
can, has, and will be created: text, precedent, history, social
practice, structure, analogy, and prudence.24
1) Text
We can start with the text of the Constitution, and in
particular with the twenty- seven words that many of you probably
know by heart: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed."25
Constitutional analysis tends to begin with the relevant text.
But that text is often not determinative. The First Amendment
begins "Congress shall make no law . . .," but it applies equally to
the President and to states.26 That Amendment protects "speech,"
but not all utterances are considered "speech" in the constitutional
sense - perjury, libel, and securities fraud, for example, trigger no
constitutional protection whatsoever.27
24. Id.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
27. See generally Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-
72 (1942) ("There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
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In the Second Amendment context, too, the text is not
completely definitive. Not all bearable weapons are "Arms"-
nuclear detonators and the like can be prohibited without a lot of
constitutional fuss.28 The Amendment protects "the right of the
people"-but clearly it does not mean every person. Incarcerated
felons don't count; neither do persons committed to a state mental
hospital.29 Then there are the hard cases.
Consider Mariano Meza-Rodriguez.30 He grew up in
Milwaukee, attending public schools until his senior year of high
school, when he dropped out so as to provide for his girlfriend and
their daughter.31 Just before midnight on August 24, 2013,
Milwaukee police responded to a complaint about a man with a
gun at a bar.32 Eventually that man was identified as Meza-
Rodriguez and, after a short foot chase, he was apprehended by
the police.33 They found a single 22 caliber cartridge in his
pocket,34 which would not be a problem for most Milwaukee
residents, but for Meza-Rodriguez constituted a crime.
Meza-Rodriguez had lived almost his entire life in Milwaukee,
but he was born in Mexico.35 His parents had brought him into the
United States illegally at age four, and he had never become an
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words. . .."); Frederick Schauer, The
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769-70 (2004).
28. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581.
29. Id. at 626.
30. See United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015). See
also Bruce Vielmetti, Unlawful Immigrants Can Have Gun Rights, Appeals Court
Rules, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 24, 2015, at A4; Ian Millhiser, Gun Rights
Win A Major Victory In Federal Court, And That's Actually A Good Thing,
THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 21, 2015, 1:59 PM) https://thinkprogress.org/gun-rights-
win-a-major-victory-in-federal-court-and-thats-actually-a-good-thing-
a25692714603#.jsj8zxlrw; Defendant's Brief at 3, United States v. Meza-
Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-3271).
31. Defendant's Brief at 3, United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664
(7th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-3271).
32. BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 1, at 140.
33. United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2015).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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American citizen or a permanent resident.36 The question in his
case, then, was whether undocumented aliens counted as "the
people" for purposes of the right to keep and bear arms.
Breaking from three other courts of appeal, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that undocumented aliens
like Meza-Rodriguez can be covered by the Second Amendment
when they are part of, or have a connection with, our national
community.37 In other words, they fall within "the people" referred
to in the Amendment's text. And yet, the court also concluded the
law banning them from possessing guns and ammunition is
constitutional. Those conclusions were guided by the
Amendment's text, but not determined by them. The text is a focal
point for constitutional interpretation, but the twenty-seven words
of the Second Amendment cannot alone resolve the 1,000 cases
that courts have faced, nor answer every question in the broader
political debate about gun rights and regulation.
2) Precedent
Cases like Meza-Rodriguez's generate a second modality of
constitutional reasoning- precedent, the rules and principles set
down by prior cases. 38 Precedent operates in at least three
directions: vertical, horizontal, and diagonal.
Vertical precedent is binding-it's what higher courts tell
lower courts they must do. In the context of the Second
Amendment, there's not very much vertical precedent coming from
the Supreme Court, since the Justices have declined dozens of
opportunities to clarify the metes and bounds of what Nelson Lund
has described as their "Delphic" decision in Heller.39
36. Id.
37. Id. at 671-72.
38. See generally Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 59 (1989); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 73 (1991).
39. See Nelson Lund, No Conservative Consensus Yet: Douglas Ginsburg,
Brett Kavanaugh, and Diane Sykes on the Second Amendment, 13 ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST Soc'Y PRAC. GROUPs 30, 32 (2012) (describing Heller as "Delphic").
David Kopel has identified remarks in several other Supreme Court decisions,
but they are not detailed decisions based on the Second Amendment. See David
114
[Volume 13
2018] The Second Amendment as Positive Law
In that vacuum, lower courts are increasingly subject to
horizontal precedent-prior cases decided by the same court. So,
for example, nearly all the federal courts of appeal have officially
adopted a two-part framework by which they first ask whether a
particular law triggers Second Amendment scrutiny at all, and
then ask whether it is constitutional in light of the government
interests served, and the private interests burdened.
There is also a third option, which we might think of as
diagonal precedent40-persuasive cases that are not binding but
might provide useful guidance. Here, the primary source of useful
information is the state courts. 41 The "individual" right to keep and
bear arms for private purposes is a new arrival in federal
constitutional law, but states have recognized such a right for over
a century, and almost universally have held that the right is
subject to "reasonable" regulation.42 For supporters of federalism,
this would seem to be a good chance to give those "laboratories of
experimentation" their due.43
3) History
In addition to learning from each other, judges often take their
cues from history. That approach has proven especially prominent
in Second Amendment cases, thanks in part to Heller's self-
consciously originalist approach.
B. Kopel, The Supreme Court's Thirty-Five Other Gun Cases: What the Supreme
Court Has Said About the Second Amendment, 18 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. REV. 99
(1999).
40. Cf. Brannon P. Denning, State Legalization of Marijuana as a "Diagonal
Federalism" Problem, 11 FIU L. Rev. 349 (2016).
41. Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S.
CAL. L. REV. 323, 380-84 (2011) (arguing for increased reliance on state
constitutional doctrine).
42. Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REV. 597, 598 (2006). Of course, gun rights legislation has been most active at the
state level, including changes to these standards that facially require
extraordinary justifications for gun legislation. See, e.g., La. Const. Art. I, §11
(imposing a strict scrutiny requirement on gun rights claims); Mo. Const. Art. I,
§23 (same).
43. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
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Heller itself said that the Second Amendment did not lay
down any novel principle, but was a right that pre-existed the
Constitution. When Justice Scalia wrote that, he referred to the
kinds of rights that the Founders - as Englishmen - would have
understood themselves to have. Justice Scalia reiterated this
notion in McDonald, stating that "traditional restrictions go to
show the scope of the right."44 With the recent additions of Justices
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, the latter of whom has argued that the
Second Amendment should be interpreted solely in light of "text,
history, and tradition,"45 history is likely to be given an even more
prominent place going forward.
That makes accurate reconstruction of the history of gun
rights and regulation crucial, and unfortunately there is perhaps
no aspect of gun law that is more misunderstood or
misrepresented.46 People on both sides of the debate sometimes
assume that "gun control" is a modern invention, but as a matter
of history, rights to keep and bear arms have always gone hand in
hand with regulation-all the way to England where this "pre-
existing" right originated.
The challenge, we have found, is in identifying the proper
historical sources and drawing relevant connections between them
and contemporary challenges. Some major colonial cities regulated
the storage of gunpowder in city limits. Does that provide a
historical precedent for safe storage requirements today? Some
cities-including famous cow towns like Dodge City and
Tombstone-effectively banned handguns within city limits.47
44. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 802 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
45. See also Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the
Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852 (2013).
46. This is not for lack of exceptional sources. See, e.g., PATRICK J. CHARLES,
ARMED IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF GUN RIGHTS FROM COLONIAL MILITIAS TO
CONCEALED CARRY (2018); H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE
MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT
(2003); Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry
Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 YALE L.J. F. 121 (2015).
47. See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L. J. 82 (2013) (arguing
that Second Amendment doctrine can be tailored to urban areas); but see Michael
P. O'Shea, Why Firearm Federalism Beats Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J.
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What relevance does that have for modern municipal gun
regulations?48
These questions cannot be answered without good, reliable
historical sources. The Repository of Historical Gun Laws, an
online resource now available through Duke Law School, attempts
to supply some of that information.49 The Repository is an effort to
collect as comprehensive as possible a list of firearm-related laws
from medieval England until the early part of the twentieth
century.50
But, as the Repository itself recognizes, collecting these
citations is only part of the historical enterprise. How often were
the laws enforced?51 What about laws that are not recorded? What
about legal enforcement through private tort suits?52 The
historical inquiry can provide essential information-as Heller
itself demonstrates-but, as with other kinds of data, it is subject
to legal interpretation.
4) Social Practice
The framers understood that the original understanding
cannot provide all the answers. James Madison himself wrote that
"it might require a regular course of practice to liquidate and settle
the meaning" of some portions of the Constitution.53 And so it is
unsurprising that courts sometimes turn to social practice,
custom, usage, convention, tradition and the like to give shape to
ONLINE 359 (2014), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/why-firearm-federalism-
beats-firearm-localism (arguing for state-level tailoring instead).
48. Id. at 117.
49. See REPOSITORY OF HISTORICAL GUN LAWS,
https://law.duke.edu/gunlaws/.
50. Id.
51. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Second Amendment Traditionalism and
Desuetude, 14 GEO. J. L. PUB. POL'Y 223 (2016).
52. Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct
Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83
U. CHI. L. REV. 295 (2016).
53. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION of 1787 435 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) (quoting letter of Madison to Judge Roane Sept. 2, 1819); see also Paul
G. Ream, Note, Liquidation of Constitutional Meaning Through Use, 66 DUKE
L.J. 1645 (2017).
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legal doctrine. Punishment violates the Eight Amendment if it is
both cruel and, in some sense, unusual by social standards.54
Sectarian prayers to solemnize political events are constitutional
in part because they have long been part of American political
culture.55 Obscenity is unprotected when 'the average person,
applying contemporary community standards' would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . ."56
This fourth modality, which we call "social practice," comes
through in Heller's rule that the Second Amendment extends to
weapons "in common use."s? But Heller doesn't say how to measure
that. Do we count all uses? All legal ones? Only self-defense uses?
Heller says that self-defense is the "core" of the right, instead of
hunting and recreation, which until very recently were the
predominant reasons for gun ownership.58 Whatever we count,
how many does it take to be common? The Fourth Circuit
considered that question in Kolbe v. Hogan,59 a case involving the
constitutionality of a ban on so-called "assault weapons." The
dissenters said that such weapons are common, noting that more
AR-15s are sold each year than Ford F-150s.6o
Of course, nothing in Heller says this is the right metric to use
when deciding the relevance of social practice.61 The sales of AR-
15s may be greater compared to Ford F-150s, but less compared to
refrigerators, or cellphones. Or less even compared to other
firearms, such as handguns.62 "Common use" could exclude
54. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469-70 (2012) (noting that the Eighth
Amendment is viewed "less through a historical prism than according to the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.")
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
55. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1818 (2014).
56. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citation omitted).
57. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).
58. See generally Joseph Blocher, Hunting and the Second Amendment, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 133 (2015).
59. Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
60. Kolbe, 849 F.3d at 153 (Traxler, J., dissenting).
61. Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-
Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1443, 1480 (2009) (discussing the empirical and definitional challenges of
counting weapons for a "common use" test).
62. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP'T
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common criminal use, but include common self-defense use. 6 3
Finally, which weapons are in common use will depend in turn on
what weapons have been allowed in the past, which leads to the
somewhat-circular result that constitutional rights are defined by
a history of regulation.64 In any event, social practice will likely
continue-explicitly or not-to be one of the means in which legal
claims on the Second Amendment are argued and articulated.
5) Structure
The focus on social practices helps demonstrate a sometimes-
underappreciated point: The right to keep and bear arms does not
exist in a vacuum. The Constitution protects other constitutional
rights, and it also protects what is often called the constitutional
"structure"-the relationship between various parts of
government and between government and private institutions.65
Under the pre-Heller militia-based reading of the Second
Amendment, for example, the right to keep and bear arms was
essentially a federalism provision, designed to protect state
militias from federal disarmament. In the post-Heller world,
different questions of federalism and structure are bound to arise.
Likewise, the Constitution divides power between the federal
government and the states, preserving a modicum of self-
governance at the sub-national level. That division has been at the
center of some of the nation's largest constitutional controversies,
from the Civil War through the battle over the Affordable Care Act
(also known as Obamacare),66 and it comes up in the gun debate
as well, for example in the recent debate about a nationwide
concealed carry reciprocity law.67 Some supporters of reciprocity
JUSTICE, FIREARMS COMMERCE IN THE UNITED STATES ANNUAL STATISTICS UPDATE
2018.
63. Volokh, supra note 58, at 1479.
64. Id. at 1481.
65. Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S.
CAL. L. REV. 323 (2011).
66. See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.
519 (2012) (upholding Affordable Care Act despite a federalism-based challenge).
67. Michele Gorman, Guns in America: NRA Boosts National Concealed
Carry Reciprocity Push, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 19, 2017),
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argue that the federal government should force states like New
York to accept concealed carry permits from places like Utah.68
Some opponents argue that this would upend the notion of
federalism, giving the federal government far too much power in
an area where it should tread lightly-if states want reciprocity,
then can agree to do so by compact, as they have done with drivers'
licenses.69
The same kinds of tensions arise with regard to other
constitutional rights and other institutions built around those
rights. Armed protestors can deter people from using the public
forum, shutting down debate and peaceable assembly.70 Schools,
universities, and places of worship all have special functions and
privileges under the First Amendment that can be threatened by
the use of firearms. The gun debate, in other words, is not simply
about a constitutional right on one side and policy considerations
on the other; it is often about the accommodation of multiple
constitutional interests.71
6) Analogy
Another tool that should be familiar to lawyers is that of
analogy - the engine of the common law.72 In the Second
Amendment context, analogy can function in many different ways,
and with varying levels of success. Some judges have suggested
looking for "lineal descendants" of guns or gun restrictions as they
stood in 1791.73 But how does one define the lineage? Cosmetic
http://www.newsweek.com/guns-america-nra-national-concealed-carry-
reciprocity- 586438.
68. Joseph Blocher, Constitutional Hurdles for Concealed Carry, TAKE CARE
BLOG, Mar. 16, 2017, https://takecareblog.com/blog/constitutional-hurdles-for-
concealed-carry-reciprocity/.
69. Id.
70. See Luke Morgan, Note, Leave Your Guns at Home: The Constitutionality
of a Prohibition on Carrying Firearms at Political Demonstrations, 68 DUKE L.J.
175 (2018).
71. See TIMOTHY ZICK, THE DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE: FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2018).
72. Cf. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1949)
("The finding of similarity or difference is the key step in the legal process.").
73. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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features? Relative firepower? In what ways is an AR-15 "related"
to a musket?
Reasoning by analogy assumes some principle or rule that
explains what makes a factor relevant, instead of idiosyncratic or
trivial.74 Some advocates have argued (though courts have
universally rejected the view) that the Second Amendment, like
the First, should forbid "prior restraints."7 But that only makes
sense if there is some relevant similarity between the two
scenarios - something that makes licensing a gun legally similar
to licensing a book, or else any comparison is simply rhetorical.
Should gun restrictions be evaluated like time, place, and manner
restrictions on speech? If so, what would that mean? Is individual
choice-of weapon, for example-as important in Second
Amendment cases as it is in those involving free speech or personal
intimacy?
7) Prudence
A final modality has to do with the role of courts as
institutional actors. There are some kinds of decisions that judges
are forbidden to make, and others that they are not well-equipped
to make. After Heller, courts can no longer duck Second
Amendment decisions, as they might have done before. But they
still have to decide how much weight to give to the determinations
of the political branches. If, for example, elected officials have
concluded that a certain kind of gun restriction would make people
more safe while respecting individuals' rights, should the courts
defer to that judgment?
This was the question that inspired the second dissenting
opinion in Heller, by Justice Breyer, which was also joined three
other Justices. Whereas Justice Stevens' dissent argued that in
fact the history showed that the right to keep and bear arms was
74. See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 744,
745 (1993).
75. E.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012)
("Plaintiffs ... suggest we apply First-Amendment prior-restraint analysis in lieu
of means-end scrutiny to assess the proper cause requirement" of a gun licensing
scheme).
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limited to the organized militia,76 Justice Breyer assumed the
existence of an "individual" right and argued that DC's law was
nonetheless constitutional.77 He cited historical sources as well,
but the center of his approach would was a kind of interest-
balancing, "with the interests protected by the Second Amendment
on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns on the
other."78 The issue for a judge, then, would be to see "whether the
regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the former in the course
of advancing the latter."79
This was anathema to Justice Scalia, who was opposed to
anything that sounds like interest-balancing.o But in many areas
of constitutional law, it is well-established that in cases of
uncertainty the Court will defer to the political branches,
particularly on empirical questions of public safety, and
particularly where the political process seems to be functioning
properly-or at least not imposing burdens on "discrete and
insular minorities."81 To do otherwise is to risk charges of judicial
activism.
As with so many other issues in this area, even a seemingly
straightforward question of how to resolve Second Amendment
challenges implicates fundamental matters of constitutional
theory. Our hope in this book is to try to show how those questions,
fundamental as they are, can be addressed using some of the
standard tools of legal reasoning.
CONCLUSION
In the spirit of looking forward, let us close by saying that
Heller is and will remain a fixture of our constitutional order.82
Most of the questions about the Second Amendment that prevailed
76. Heller, 554 U.S. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 682 (Breyer J., dissenting)
78. Id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79. Id (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 634 ("We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose
core protection has been subjected to a freestanding 'interest-balancing'
approach.").
81. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
82. BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 1, at 176-82.
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twenty or thirty years ago are no longer relevant. Our goal in The
Positive Second Amendment is to help usher in a new era of Second
Amendment discussion, one that doesn't try to re-litigate old
debates, but understands that new issues need to be addressed
with new ideas. We do not suppose that we can answer all those
issues, but we hope to have identified some of the grammar-the
modalities-that will be necessary.
Today, we are stepping into a new era of Second Amendment
law and scholarship-a positive one. We are excited by the
possibility of a richer and more productive discussion about the
past, present, and future of gun rights and regulation, and we are
glad to be a part of that conversation with all of you.
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